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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§78-2-2(3) and (5) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
1. The issue presented for review is whether the court of appeals erred in 
affirming an award of treble damages for loss, damage and depreciation to personal 
property under Utah's forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). The court 
of appeals' decision on the law is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. 
Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below. [See, e.g., R. 103-112; 169-176; 217-226; 230-
231; 346-356; 529 at 558-579; 304-307 and the court of appeals' decision, Aris Vision 
Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326, Tffl31-33.] 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Aris leased premises from JDJ in Salt Lake County for the operation of a laser eye 
surgery clinic (the "Premises"). Wasatch managed the Premises for JDJ. Aris ceased all 
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business operations and vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002 without paying rent. 
Without JDJ's knowledge or consent, Aris turned over possession of the Premises to the 
independent contractor doctors who performed surgeries at the Premises to conduct their 
own business on the Premises while Aris and the doctors attempted to negotiate an 
agreement for the doctors to purchase Aris's equipment and other personal property 
(collectively, the "Personal Property") on the Premises and assume Aris's Lease with JDJ. 
When Aris and the doctors had been unable to come to an agreement, Aris sent a 
representative to the Premises on January 22, 2002 to remove the Personal Property that 
the doctors were then utilizing in their business. When Aris was not permitted to remove 
the Personal Property, Aris filed (but did not serve) a Complaint in this action alleging 
forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion of its Personal Property, as well as a 
claim for declaratory relief. Aris sought damages for not being permitted to remove its 
Personal Property. Aris also sought replevin of its Personal Property. [R. 1-26] 
On or about February 15, 2002, Aris filed and served an Amended Complaint [R. 
27-48] and a motion for a writ of replevin and supporting memorandum and affidavits. 
[R. 49-86] The hearing on the replevin motion was later postponed and then cancelled 
and the parties worked together for several months to attempt to re-let the Premises and 
sell the Personal Property. When these efforts were unsuccessful, Wasatch and JDJ 
permitted Aris to remove the Personal Property from the Premises on July 2, 2002. On 
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October 28, 2002, JDJ filed a Counterclaim seeking lost rental damages for Aris's breach 
of the Lease. [R. 103-112] 
A bench trial was held before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on October 14 
through 16, 2003. [R. 526-528] Thereafter, closing arguments were heard by Judge Lewis 
on November 14, 2003. [R. 529] 
On January 27, 2004, Judge Lewis entered a Memorandum Decision finding in 
favor of Aris on the Complaint and dismissing JDJ's Counterclaim. Judge Lewis allowed 
Aris recovery on its forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion claims in the 
amount of $187,687.60 for depreciation and damage to the Personal Property, and for the 
value of missing equipment. Judge Lewis then trebled those damages, relying on Utah 
Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). Judge Lewis also awarded Aris its attorney's fees under the 
Lease. Judge Lewis refused to award punitive damages, ruling that the actions of 
Wasatch and JDJ did not amount to a knowing and reckless indifference or disregard of 
Aris's rights. [R. 369-375] 
Judge Lewis entered judgment in favor of Aris on March 12, 2004. [R. 474] 
Wasatch and JDJ filed a Notice of Appeal from that judgment on March 22, 2004. [R. 
477] 
On July 21, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Opinion affirming the 
Judgment. The Honorable Gregory K. Orme dissented on the issues of the award of 
treble damages and the award of depreciation damages. [See App. A] 
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On November 3, 2005, this Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
respect to the issue of whether treble damages were properly awarded for damages to 
personal property. [App. B] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In accordance with Wasatch's and JDJ's obligation to marshal the evidence, the 
following facts are set forth in a light most favorable to Aris and are based almost wholly 
upon the testimony of Aris's own witnesses: 
1. Aris is a California company that owned and operated a laser eye surgery center 
(the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 of the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in 
Murray, Utah (the "Premises"), that Aris leased from JDJ. [R. 409-410, Findings Nos. 1 
& 6] The term of the Lease ran through July 31, 2006. [R. 528 at 381-382; Pi's Exs. 9 & 
11] 
2. Wasatch was a sister company of JDJ, and managed the Woodlands Towers 
building as JDJ's agent. [R. 410, Finding No. 8] 
3. Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as the manager of the Center and 
contracted with four physicians (the "Doctors") on an independent contractor basis to 
perform eye surgeries at the Center. [R. 409, Finding No. 2] 
4. Aris owned all the equipment and furniture (collectively the "Personal 
Property") located at the Center. [R. 527 at 234] 
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Aris Vacated the Premises 
5. According to the evidence presented by Aris, the laser eye surgery market 
collapsed and on January 3, 2002 Aris decided to close all of its centers the next day, 
January 4, 2002, and file bankruptcy. All Aris employees, including Skalka, were 
terminated on January 4, 2002 and Aris ceased doing business in Utah on that date. [R. 
526 at 38-39; R. 527 at 234-235 & 263-264] 
6. Aris presented the testimony of its employees that over the weekend after 
January 4, 2002, Aris decided not to file bankruptcy. By January 7, 2002, Aris had 
decided to allow the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on the 
Premises while Aris attempted to come to terms with the Doctors on the purchase of the 
Personal Property and assumption of the Lease, On or about January 7, Aris initiated 
negotiation with the Doctors and agreed that they could use the Personal Property and 
Premises while they negotiated. [R. 527 at 235-237] 
7. Aris did not notify Wasatch or JDJ in advance that it was terminating its 
business or that it was turning over the Premises to the Doctors. [R. 212, [^18] 
8. Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1, 2002 
when it was due pursuant to the Lease. [R. 526 at 9-10] When Aris failed to pay rent, 
Wasatch sent out two notices that the rent was past due. Aris did not respond to the 
notices. [R. 528 at 384; Pi's Ex. 1, ^ 16] 
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The Personal Property 
9. Sometime after Aris terminated its operations, Wasatch's property manager, 
Dennis Peacock ("Peacock"), asked Skalka what was going on, Aris had not made the 
January rent payment. Skalka told him that he had been terminated by Aris and of Aris's 
financial trouble and provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which 
indicated that Aris had terminated Skalka's employment, was ceasing all operations and 
would likely file for bankruptcy protection. Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's 
Personal Property could not be removed from the Premises until Wasatch "found out what 
was going on with Aris." [R. 527 at 299-301; R. 411, Finding Nos. 15-18] 
10. Paragraph 20.1 of the Lease provided in part: 
All moveable personal property of Tenant not removed from the premises 
upon the abandonment thereof (as defined at Title 78, Chapter 36 of the 
Utah Code Ann. or similar replacement provisions) or upon the termination 
of this Lease for any cause whatsoever shall conclusively be deemed to 
have been abandoned and may be appropriated, sold, stored, destroyed or 
otherwise disposed of by Landlord without notice to Tenant or any other 
person and without any obligation to account therefore. 
11. When the negotiations between Aris and Skalka and the Doctors proved 
unsuccessful, Aris directed that Richard Enright ("Enright"), its Director of Operations, 
come to Utah to determine if Skalka and the Doctors had any interest in purchasing the 
Personal Property and, if not, to remove the Personal Property. [R. 526 at 36 & 39] 
Enright came to Utah without prior notice on January 22, 2002. [Id. at 39 & 89] 
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12. When Enright arrived at the Premises, he walked through the space with 
Skalka. [Id. at 41-42] There were certain rooms Skalka would not let him enter. [Id. at 83] 
The Doctors were preparing for surgeries that day. It was business as usual. Enright did 
not have a key to the Premises. Enright asked to do an inventory. Skalka said it would be 
pointless to do an inventory because Wasatch had seized the assets. Skalka did not give 
Enright permission to take the Personal Property, but told him he would have to speak 
with Peacock, Wasatch's property manager at the building. [Id. at 41-42] 
13. Skalka took Enright downstairs to meet Peacock, introduced him to Peacock 
as Richard Enright from Aris Vision and told Peacock that Enright was there to remove 
the Personal Property. Peacock said that the Personal Property could not be removed 
because Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to 
pay the January rent and that as a result, Wasatch had seized the Personal Property. [R. 
526 at 41-43; R. 413, Finding No. 26] 
14. Enright tendered a check for the rent, but Peacock refused to accept it. 
Peacock stated that it was too late, that Aris had abandoned the premises and that 
Wasatch was not taking Aris's money. Enright denied there had been an abandonment. 
[Id. at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 27] 
15. Enright called Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, and told her what had 
occurred. Soto then spoke with Skalka and Peacock. Peacock told Soto that Aris had 
abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January 
8 
rent. Peacock told Soto that Wasatch was therefore entitled to seize Aris's Personal 
Property under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease. [R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] Soto testified 
that she responded that Aris was pursuing its right under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to 
remove its Personal Property before surrendering the Premises. [R. 413, Finding No. 30] 
Soto offered to pay the January rent immediately by wire transfer, but Peacock indicated 
it was too late and the payment would not be accepted. [Id., Finding No. 31 ] 
16. Peacock told Enright that he needed to leave the Premises and threatened to 
have the police remove Enright if he did not leave. [R. 526 at 44-45] Enright testified that 
he and Peacock did not have a confrontation on January 22, but "basically a discussion". 
[R. 526 at 76-77] Enright left the Premises without removing any Personal Property. [R. 
414, Finding No. 35] 
17. Aris did not have any keys to the Premises which were occupied by the 
Doctors. During his visit, Enright requested a key from Skalka and then requested a key 
from Peacock. They both refused to give Enright a key. [Id. at 47] 
18. Aris then retained Erik Olson ("Olson") with the law firm of Durham, Jones & 
Pinegar, who filed (but did not serve) a Complaint on behalf of Aris on January 23, 2002, 
seeking replevin of the Personal Property and damages for the refusal to give Aris the 
Personal Property. [R. 414, Finding No. 37] 
19. On January 24, 2002, Olson talked with John A. Dahlstrom, Jr. ("Dahlstrom"), 
the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Wasatch. Olson told Dahlstrom 
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that Aris wanted to remove the Personal Property and wanted access to the Premises to do 
so. Dahlstrom responded, "let's see if we can work out a deal". Olsen testified that 
Dahlstrom was extremely professional. Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a 
"business solution" under which Aris would sell its Personal Property to Skalka and the 
Doctors and they would assume the Lease. Aris agreed to pursue such an arrangement. 
[R. 526 at 153-155; R. 528 at 441-442; R. 415, Finding No. 40] Aris recognized that it 
was on the hook for some sort of ongoing monthly rent obligation. [R. 526 at 154-156] 
20. Olson acknowledged that between January 24 and February 15, 2002, the 
parties were mutually cooperating in an effort to move Skalka and the Doctors into the 
Premises. [R. 527 at 219-220] 
21. The Doctors moved out of the Premises on February 9, 2002 and moved into a 
smaller space in the Building. Wasatch did not supervise the move or retrieve the keys to 
the Premises. [R. 527 at 249-251 & Pi's Ex. 12; R. 416, Finding No. 46] Aris and the 
Doctors did not work out an arrangement for the Doctors to purchase the Personal 
Property. Soto never asked Skalka to remove the Personal Property after Enright left on 
January 22. [R. 527 at 330] 
22. When the Doctors vacated the Premises, Peacock changed the locks in part to 
safeguard the Personal Property so that Skalka and the Doctors who had previous keys 
would no longer be able to have access to the Premises. Aris and Olson did not ask for a 
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key and Peacock did not give Aris or Olson a key. [R. 527 at 189; 338 & 345] Wasatch 
did not advise Aris that the locks had been changed. [Finding No. 47 at R. 488] 
23. When Olson heard nothing further from Dahlstrom by mid-February (this was 
during the Olympics), Olson filed and served an Amended Complaint and also a motion 
for a writ of replevin for possession of the Personal Property. [R. 526 at 157-159; Pi's 
Exs. 1&2] 
24. Olson discussed the motion for writ of replevin with Dahlstrom a few times. 
Dahlstrom said that Wasatch would fight the motion and that Aris could not win, but even 
if it did, Aris would have to post an undertaking in the amount of hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. Dahlstrom said that Olson could not expect Wasatch to let all security just 
walk out the door leaving Wasatch holding the bag. [R. 526 at 160-161] 
25. The writ of replevin hearing was originally scheduled for February 26, 2002. 
At Dahlstrom's request, the hearing was rescheduled for March 5, 2002. [R. 526 at 161-
162] 
26. Olson then cancelled the March 5 hearing. Olson testified he did so based 
upon Dahlstrom's statements that he would oppose the motion and there would be a large 
undertaking, but there was no evidence he told Dahlstrom his reason. Aris left the 
Personal Property on the Premises. Olson and Dahlstrom agreed to work together to try 
to find a new tenant to reduce the damage claim against Aris. It was Olson's intent to try 
to reduce Aris's exposure and at the same time avoid the necessity for Aris to file a large 
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undertaking. Olson was aware that Aris had four and a half years remaining on a seven-
year lease at approximately $20 a square foot. [R. 527 at 199; R. 528 at 470-471] 
27. The parties also agreed to put the litigation on hold while they worked 
together to find a new tenant. [R. 527 at 164-166; R. 528 at 470-471] In the seven 
months following February 15, Olson took no further action in court to prosecute the 
claims until after JDJ's Counterclaim was filed in October 2002. [R. 527 at 197] 
28. After January 22, 2002, there was never any occasion when Aris was denied 
access to the Premises or attempted to remove any Personal Property from the Premises 
where Aris was restrained from doing so. [R. 526 at 13; R. 527 at 200-201] After March 
5, 2002, Peacock opened the Premises on several occasions so that Aris could inventory 
the Personal Property and show the Premises to prospective tenants. [R. 526 at 12] 
29. After March 5, Olson and Dahlstrom had subsequent conversations where they 
would catch up with each other about leads for replacement tenants. [R. 527 at 168] 
30. Within a week or two after March 5, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris wanted 
access to the Premises for the purpose of inventorying the Personal Property to make sure 
that nothing was damaged or missing. Dahlstrom agreed and had Olson make 
arrangements directly with Peacock. [R. 527 at 166-167] Dahlstrom told Peacock to let 
Aris in any time they asked and to be courteous and help in any way and cooperate. [R. 
528 at 361-362] 
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31. One of the visits Olson arranged to the Premises was on April 29, 2002 for the 
purpose of showing Ed Barber the space. Mr. Barber was interested in perhaps leasing 
the space and perhaps purchasing some of the Personal Property. A week later Aris had 
another visit with Barber at the Premises. [R. 527 at 168-169; R. 526 at 54-55 & 57] 
Peacock was also present during, and supervised, these visits. [Id. at 58] On the April 25 
visit, Enright requested that Aris be allowed to remove one item of equipment, a 
microkeratome, and Peacock agreed. [Id. at 62] 
32. Olson understood that the Personal Property would have greater value in place 
if they could find a new tenant and that is why Aris was working with Barber in April and 
May to get him to not only buy the equipment, but to move into the Premises. [R. 527 at 
223] 
33. Sometime before May 20, 2002, Aris reached an agreement with Barber to 
purchase some of the equipment for $35,000. [Id. at 171, 173 & 266] 
34. Aris worked with Barber for quite a while on taking over the Premises, but 
was unsuccessful. [Id. at 171-172] 
35. In late May or early June, 2002, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris was not 
making much progress with getting Barber into the space. Olson turned Barber over to 
Dahlstrom and Wasatch in the hope that they could work something out with Barber to 
lease the Premises. [Id. at 172-173] 
36. On June 4, 2002, Olson wrote a letter to Dahlstrom in which he stated: 
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As we have discussed over the phone on several occasions, it remains 
Aris's intention at the present time to postpone indefinitely the litigation of 
the lawsuit Aris has filed against Wasatch including the motion for writ of 
replevin in hopes that either Aris or Wasatch can work together in good 
faith to find a new tenant to occupy the premises. In the meantime, Aris 
will leave its valuable equipment in the space. Aris's efforts to find a 
tenant should not be construed in any way to negate Wasatch's duty, if 
any, to mitigate the damages. [Id. at 173 & Pi's Ex. 24]1 [Emphasis added] 
37. Olson and Enright went to the Premises with Barber on June 10, 2002 to close 
the equipment sale. Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said he did not have authorization 
for Aris to remove the equipment yet, but anticipated he could get it, but not in time to 
close the deal on that day. Olson then told Aris and Barber they were not able to proceed 
with the sale that day. [R. 527 at 175-177] 
38. The next day Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said Wasatch would only 
agree to the transaction if the $35,000 was paid to Wasatch. Olson said there was no way 
Aris would agree to that. Dahlstrom then said he would see if his client would be willing 
to take $10,000. [Id. at 177-178] 
39. Approximately ten days later when Olson had not heard from Dahlstrom, he 
told Dahlstrom that Aris was going to go forward with the lawsuit and proceed with the 
motion for writ of replevin to get possession of the Personal Property. Dahlstrom 
responded on approximately June 25 that Aris could go ahead and remove the Personal 
1
 Olson testified that he included in his letter the language about the equipment 
staying on the Premises based upon the fact that the writ hearing had been cancelled so 
Aris was unable to remove the equipment and that he did not intend to waive any claims. 
[Id. at 173-174] 
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Property. [Id. at 178-179] Judge Lewis found that Dahlstrom's instructions were a 
change from Wasatch's previous instructions not to allow Aris to remove the Personal 
Property and that Wasatch refused to allow Aris to take the Personal Property as a 
"bargaining chip" in Wasatch's negotiations with Aris over the payment of rent. [R. 421, 
Finding No. 76; R. 424, Finding No. 89] 
40. The equipment sale to Barber was consummated on July 2, 2002. He did not 
ask for a discount because of the delay. [Id. at 264 & 266-267] 
41. On July 2, 2002, Aris removed all of the Personal Property from the Premises. 
[R. 527 at 240] Two of the lasers were inoperable. [Id. at 251-252]2 
Aris's Claimed Damages 
42. Soto testified that two of the lasers were damaged so when Aris settled with 
VISX the amount of the credit which VISX gave for those lasers was reduced by $53,000 
and Judge Lewis awarded this amount. [Id. at 252-253]3 
43. There were missing items of equipment. [Id. at 243] Enright did not know who 
took the missing Personal Property or if Skalka or the Doctors took any of the equipment 
2
 JDJ subsequently relet the Premises at a substantially reduced rent because of 
market conditions. The undisputed evidence was that JDJ lost $174,561.17. [R. 528 at 
395, 397-398, 515-516 and Ex. 65] 
3
 Soto speculated that the damage to the lasers had to occur sometime after 
February 9, 2002 when the Doctors vacated the Premises because the Doctors were 
performing surgeries using those lasers. [Id. at 251-252] Soto did not know whether any 
of the Aris employees who were fired or any of the Doctors damaged the lasers as they 
moved out. [Id. at 288] Skalka did not know one way or another whether any of the 
lasers were broken when the Doctors moved out of the Center. [Id. at 329] 
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when they moved out. [R. 526 at 108] Judge Lewis awarded Aris $16,118.82 for the 
missing equipment. [R. 494, Finding No. 80] 
44. Richard Holdren ("Holdren") testified on behalf of Aris as its damage expert. 
Mr. Holdren appraises and sells medical practices and equipment. [R. 526 at 112] 
Holdren was asked to value the Personal Property as of January 22, 2002 and as of a date 
approximately five months later to determine the difference in value. Holdren testified 
that the Personal Property depreciated in value by $118,568.81 during the five months it 
remained on the Premises and Judge Lewis awarded damages in that amount. 
[Id. at 121-122] 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Aris vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002 without notice and without paying 
rent. At that time, Aris terminated all of its Utah employees and all of its business 
operations in Utah, as well as throughout the country. On January 7, in breach of the 
Lease, Aris turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor Doctors 
to operate their own independent business on the Premises while Aris and the Doctors 
attempted to work out an arrangement for Aris to take over the Lease and purchase Aris's 
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Personal Property. After January 4, 2002, Aris had no desire or ability to occupy the 
Premises. 
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Lewis's ruling that Wasatch and JDJ 
wrongfully withheld Aris's Personal Property by only allowing access to the Personal 
Property to Aris when Aris requested for the purpose of inventorying it and showing it to 
third parties. The only damages sought by Aris or awarded to Aris were damages for 
depreciation in the value of the Personal Property; damage to the Personal Property and 
missing items of Personal Property. No damages were sought or awarded to Aris relating 
to its inability to occupy the Premises because Aris had no desire or ability to occupy the 
Premises. The court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision awarding Aris 
treble damages under Utah's real estate forcible detainer statute where the only damages 
suffered were with respect to conversion of the Personal Property and Aris did not seek to 
reoccupy the Premises and had no desire or ability to do so. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
The testimony of Aris's own employees at trial established that Aris vacated the 
Premises on January 4, 2002 without notice and without paying rent, terminated all 
business operations in Utah as well as throughout the country on that date and, in breach 
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of the Lease, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor 
Doctors to conduct their own independent business on January 7. 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals affirmed Judge Lewis's rulings that (1) Aris had 
not abandoned the Premises because it had turned the Premises over to the independent 
contractor Doctors and did not intend to abandon4; and (2) when two and a half weeks 
later, on January 22, 2002, Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to remove its Personal 
Property from the Premises because JDJ had seized that property under paragraph 20.1 of 
the Lease, Wasatch and JDJ were guilty of forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and 
conversion of the Personal Property. 
Moreover, the court of appeals affirmed - - over Judge Orme's dissent - - Judge 
Lewis's ruling trebling the Personal Property conversion damages under Utah's real estate 
treble damage statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). This incredible result was reached 
even though Aris was voluntarily cooperating with Wasatch and JDJ for months to relet 
the Premises and sell the Personal Property to a new tenant in order to mitigate Aris's 
liability for damages. It is respectfully submitted that the court of appeals erred in 
awarding treble damages under the real estate forcible detainer statute for conversion of 
personal property. 
4
 The court of appeals ruled that Aris had not abandoned the Premises because it had no 
intent to do so even though subjective intent is irrelevant to statutory abandonment under Utah 
Code Ann., §78-36-12.3 and the three elements required for statutory abandonment were clearly 
met. 
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There was no claim or evidence that Aris suffered any damage by virtue of the 
alleged detainer of the real estate. Aris had ceased all business operations in Utah and 
had vacated the Premises on January 4, 2002. Aris had no employees in Utah; Aris had 
no business in Utah; and Aris had no use for the Premises or any ability to occupy the 
Premises. In fact, when Aris's Enright came to Utah on January 22, 2002, the 
independent contractor Doctors to whom Aris had transferred possession of the Premises 
were occupying the Premises and continued to do so until February 9, 2002. Aris made 
no demand that the Doctors vacate. Enright only sought access to the Premises to remove 
the Personal Property; he did not seek possession of the Premises. Similarly, his boss, 
Soto, told Wasatch's Peacock at that time when Peacock told her that JDJ had seized the 
Personal Property under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease that Aris was entitled to remove the 
Personal Property before surrendering the Premises to JDJ. 
In short, at most, all the evidence demonstrated was that Aris wanted to remove its 
Personal Property from the Premises. That is not a legal basis for an award of treble 
damages under Utah's real property forcible detainer statute. 
Wasatch and JDJ have been unable to find any Utah cases dealing with the issue of 
whether treble damages can be awarded for conversion of a tenant's personal property.5 
5
 The only cases that Wasatch and JDJ have been able to locate from other jurisdictions 
on this issue are cases decided many years ago in New York and Michigan in which the courts 
held that in forcible entry or detainer cases treble damages could not be recovered for injuries to 
personal property. See Arout v. Azar, 219 N.Y.S. 431 (1927); Carman v. Scott, 137 N.W. 655 
(Mich. 1912); Shaw v. Hoffman, 1872 WL 3228, *4 (Mich. 1872). 
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However, the treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute is a drastic 
remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing tenants of their possession of 
real property. Consequently, the statute should be strictly construed. Van Zyverden v. 
Farrar, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1964); Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930) 
("The provision for damages in three times the amount of damages is highly penal and 
therefore subject to strict construction"). Cf Keller v. Southwood North Medical 
Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 108 (Utah 1998) (forcible entry statute only applies to types of 
property people can occupy). See also Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (Nev. 
1980). A landlord's act in converting a tenant's personal property is distinct from the act 
of forcibly detaining real property a tenant is occupying. A tenant should be relegated to 
an action for conversion and replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible 
detainer statute should not be applied to a landlord's alleged wrongful withholding of 
personal property, especially after the tenant has vacated the premises. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Orme stated that he was "baffled" by the 
affirmance of the award of treble damages for conversion of personal property based 
upon the real estate forcible detainer statute that permits the "extraordinary remedy of 
tripling the amount of actual damages". Judge Orme correctly recognized that the "severe 
remedy of treble damages is available because of the special status of real estate, and it is 
a remedy that is pretty well limited to real property contexts." [2005 UT App. 325 at [^36] 
Judge Orme concluded that "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing policy 
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favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and landlord just 
because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation." [Id.] 
Although Aris has never contended that the Personal Property damage constituted 
consequential damage resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, Judge Orme 
reasoned that even if the Personal Property damage could be viewed as constituting 
consequential damages, the Personal Property damage was not recoverable as 
consequential damage because no general damages constituting reasonable rental value of 
the Premises were sought or awarded. See, Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 207, 211 and 214 
(Utah 1930) overruled in part on other grounds, P. K Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 108 (Utah 
1991); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-1026 (Utah App. 1989). Judge 
Orme correctly observed that consequential damages cannot be recovered unless general 
damages are awarded. See, Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039, 1041-1043 (Utah 
1981); Cohn v. 1 C Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975). 
The award of treble damages in this case is especially ironic given the fact that 
Aris had turned over possession of the Premises to the independent contractor doctors 
weeks before the conversion of the Personal Property found by the court of appeals 
occurred. Aris had no desire or ability to reoccupy the Premises; Aris was working with 
Wasatch and JDJ for months to attempt to relet the Premises and sell the Personal 
Property to mitigate Aris's liability for future rent; and the trial court refused to award 
punitive damages against Wasatch and JDJ with respect to conversion of the Personal 
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Property because the trial court determined they did not act with knowing and reckless 
indifference or disregard of Aris's rights. [R. 369-375] 
In summary, the real estate forcible detainer statute should not be applied to 
sanction the drastic penalty of treble damages for conversion of personal property. 
Moreover, even if such a treble damage award could be given as consequential damages 
where a landlord deprives a tenant of possession of the real estate, the treble damages 
awarded in the present case could not be justified. Aris had turned over possession of the 
Premises to the independent contractor doctors weeks before the Personal Property was 
withheld and Aris did not seek to reoccupy the Premises and had no reason or ability to 
do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment 
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages. 
DATED this / 5 ^ day of December, 2005. 
BURBIDj 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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(1) tenant's actions were insufficient to constitute 
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(2) tenants actions were insufficient to constitute 
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(3) landlord used force and threats to unlawfully 
hold and keep possession of leased premises, 
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under the forcible detainer statute, 
(5) landlord wrongfully evicted tenant, 
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Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME 
OPINION 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge 
**1 Defendants appeal a judgment m favor of Aris 
Vision Institute, Inc (Aris) for forcible detainer, 
wrongful eviction, and conversion of personal 
property We affirm 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Aris, a California corporation, owned and 
operated a laser eye surgery center (the premises) 
located at the Woodlands Business Park in Murray, 
Utah Aris owned all the equipment and furniture 
(collectively, "equipment") located at the premises 
Aris contracted with four doctors to perform eye 
surgeries on the premises using Ans's equipment 
and hired a manager, David Skalka Aris leased the 
premises from Defendant JDJ Properties, Inc (JDJ), 
pursuant to a 1995 lease agreement Defendant 
Wasatch Property Management, Inc (Wasatch), a 
sister company and an agent of JDJ, managed the 
premises and collected rents from Aris 
**3 After an industry downturn, Aris made the 
decision to close the business and contemplated 
filing for bankruptcy On January 4, 2002, Aris 
terminated Skalka and provided vanous notices to 
him and vanous vendors that it "was in the 
unfortunate position of havmg to wind down it[s] 
current operations and liquidate its business prior to 
dissolution" In early January, Axis began 
negotiations with the doctors and Skalka to sell the 
equipment and transfer the lease During the 
negotiations, Skalka and the doctors contmued to 
occupy the premises and perform surgeries usmg 
Ans's equipment 
**4 Aris failed to pay the January rent of 
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$9,556 38 Skalka notified Wasatch's building 
manager, Dennis Peacock, and property manager, 
Anita Lockhart, about Aris's intention to terminate 
the business and file for bankruptcy Peacock 
instructed Skalka to not let anyone remove the 
equipment from the premises 
**5 The negotiations between Aris and the doctors 
proved unsuccessful On January 22, 2002, Richard 
Enright, an Aris manager, came to the premises to 
remove Aris's equipment Upon Enright's arrival, 
Skalka recited Peacock's instructions that Aris was 
not allowed to remove the equipment and told 
Enright that he should speak with Peacock directly 
Peacock told Enright that, by Aris's failure to pay 
the January rent, it had abandoned the premises and 
that Defendants had seized Aris's equipment 
Enright tendered a check for the January rent, but 
Peacock refused to accept the check or to release 
the equipment 
**6 While still in the presence of Skalka and 
Peacock, Enright phoned Kathleen Soto, Aris's 
CFO Soto spoke with Peacock and requested that 
Wasatch release the equipment to Axis, offering 
agam to pay the January rent Peacock again 
refused to accept the rent or to release the 
equipment Enright made one more request for the 
equipment Peacock responded by instructing 
Enright to leave the premises and threatened "*27 
to have the police forcefully remove Enright if he 
ever returned again" Sometime during this visit, 
Enright requested a key from Skalka and Peacock, 
but both refused the request 
**7 The next day, Aris's attorney, Erik Olson, 
filed this action He also requested from John 
Dahlstrom, Defendants' attorney, permission to 
enter the premises and remove the equipment, and 
also tendered the January rent payment Dahlstrom 
refused to release the equipment or to accept the 
tender of rent Dahlstrom suggested that a "business 
solution" be considered by Aris and the doctors, 
basically suggesting that they resume their 
negotiations Based on this suggestion, Aris agam 
negotiated with the doctors and Skalka m hopes that 
they would assume the lease and purchase the 
equipment Again the negotiations proved 
© 2005 Thomson/West No C 
Page 4 
unsuccessful Unknown to Aris, Wasatch and the 
doctors were negotiating a separate lease, where the 
doctors would occupy other space in Woodlands 
Business Park 
**8 In early February, Skalka and the doctors 
relocated within Woodlands Business Park, without 
supervision from Wasatch Peacock changed the 
locks on the premises and did not provide notice or 
a key to Aris A few days later, Aris served a writ of 
replevin for the equipment Dahlstrom informed 
Olson that Wasatch would protest the writ of 
replevin and seek a large bond Based on Wasatch's 
assertions, Aris agreed to postpone the hearing on 
its writ of replevin and to help Wasatch locate a 
new tenant 
**9 From March to June 2002, Wasatch provided 
Aris limited, supervised access to the premises 
Peacock would unlock the premises and then 
supervise the visit in order to ensure that Aris did 
not remove any equipment In March, during a 
supervised visit, Enright mventoned the equipment 
and discovered that sometime after his January 22 
visit, two lasers had been damaged and other 
equipment had been removed The missing 
equipment included a Statim autoclave worth 
$393 60, a Compaq laptop worth $574 98, a 
Hansatome microkeratome worth $14,164 68, and 
several sunglasses worth $985 56 During another 
supervised \isit, Peacock gave Aris permission to 
remove one piece of equipment but insisted that 
Aris was not allowed to remove any other 
equipment 
**10 In April, Aris and Ed Barber were m 
negotiations for Barber to purchase some of the 
equipment and assume the lease By May, the 
negotiations had ended, with Barber agreeing only 
to the sale of the equipment Before finalizing the 
sale, Olson asked Dahlstrom for his consent 
Dahlstrom replied that he did not anticipate a 
problem but that he would need to check with 
Wasatch On June 10, 2002, Olson met with Barber 
and Peacock at the premises to close the sale 
Dahlstrom stopped the transaction because Wasatch 
had not yet approved the sale A few days later, 
Dahlstrom informed Olson that Wasatch would 
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approve the sale only if Wasatch received all the 
proceeds Ans did not agree to Wasatch's condition 
**11 Later in June, Sale Lake County posted a 
notice of seizure on the premises for past due 
property taxes After the county posted the notice, 
Peacock changed the locks a second time and again 
did not provide notice or keys to Ans About that 
same time, Soto came to Utah with the mtention of 
breaking the locks and removing the equipment 
She discovered the tax notice and went to the Salt 
Lake County Assessor's office and paid the past due 
amount She did not remove the equipment that day 
because it appeared that Wasatch's employees were 
guarding the premises 
**12 After Soto's visit, Olson informed Dahlstrom 
that Axis mtended to proceed with the lawsuit On 
June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom told Olson that Ans 
could remove all of its equipment and represented 
that Wasatch never intended to withhold the 
equipment Lockhart, via email, instructed Peacock 
to allow Ans to remove the equipment Peacock 
responded with the question, "Is this corcect?" 
Lockhart confirmed that Ans was now entitled to 
remove all of its equipment On July 2, 2002, Soto 
removed Ans's equipment and the sale to Barber 
finally took place 
**13 Ans proceeded with its lawsuit, and 
Defendants counterclaimed for unpaid rent During 
the three-day bench trial, Ans introduced a written 
report and expert witness *28 testimony that the 
equipment had depreciated m the amount of 
$118,568 81 while m Wasatch's custody Wasatch 
did not offer any depreciation evidence or rebuttal 
testimony The distnct court found that Ans did not 
vacate or surrender the premises, but rather that 
Wasatch had forcefully prevented Ans from 
enjoying "free, unfettered access to the Premises " 
Additionally, the district court determined that 
Wasatch had seized Ans's equipment without the 
proper judicial process and used it as a "bargaining 
chip" for the unpaid rent 
**14 The distnct court held that Defendants were 
liable for forcible detamer, wrongful eviction, and 
conversion of the equipment The distnct court 
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awarded damages for the following depreciation in 
the amount of $118,568 81, missing equipment in 
the amount of $16,11882, and damage to Ans's 
lasers in the amount of $53,000 The damages 
totaled $187,687 63, which the distnct court trebled 
pursuant to the forcible detainer statute The 
district court additionally awarded Ans its deposit 
of $13,393 89, less the January rent of $9,556 38, 
plus costs and attorney fees The district court 
dismissed Defendants' counterclaim based on its 
holding that Ans did not abandon the premises 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] **15 First, Defendants argue that the 
district court erred in ruling that Ans did not 
abandon the premises Utah Code section 
78-36-12 3 provides a statutory presumption for 
abandonment See Utah Code Ann § 78- 36-12 3 
(2002) We review the district court's application of 
the statute to the facts of the case for abuse of 
discretion See Platts v Parents Helping Parents, 
947 P2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) Common-law 
abandonment depends on the intent of the party 
accused of the act See State v Hawkins, 967 P 2d 
966, 970 (Utah Ct App 1998) The determination 
of mtent is a question of fact, which will only be 
reversed if the district court's finding is clearly 
erroneous See Pennington v Allstate Ins Co, 973 
P2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998), see also 49 AmJur2d 
Landlord and Tenant § 250 (1995) ("[A] question 
of abandonment is a factual one ") 
[3][4] **16 Second, Defendants claim that the 
district court erced in holdmg Defendants liable for 
forcible detamer pursuant to Utah Code section 
78-36-2 and for wrongful eviction See Utah Code 
Ann § 78-36-2 (2002) This issue is a mixed 
question of law and fact "Matters of statutory 
construction are questions of law that are reviewed 
for conectness" Platts, 947 P 2d at 661 
"Questions of fact are reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard, with deference given to the tnal 
court" Id "The trial court's application of law to 
the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion" Id 
[5] **17 Third, Defendants argue that the distnct 
court ereed in holding that they converted Ans's 
equipment because Ans waived its conversion 
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claim. To find a waiver, the court must ascertain 
whether Aris intended to waive the claim. See 
Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 
942 (Utah 1993). The determination of intent is a 
question of fact, and thus, will only be reversed if 
the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. See 
Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937. 
[6] **18 Finally, Defendants contend that the 
district court erred in its assessment of damages. 
"Because the adequacy of damages is a question of 
fact, we cannot overturn the trial court's findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous." In re Estate oj 
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Abandonment 
[7] **19 Defendants argue that Aris abandoned 
the premises prior to January 22, 2002. Utah Code 
section 78-36-12.3(3) provides: 
"Abandonment" is presumed in either of the 
following situations: (a) the tenant has not 
notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent 
within 15 days after the due date, and there is no 
reasonable evidence other than the presence of 
the tenant's personal property that the tenant is 
occupying the premises.... 
*29 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3). The statute 
"defines 'abandonment' as vacating the premises 
without notice by the tenant to the landlord." 
Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d 940, 
941 (Utah 1988). Defendants argue that Aris 
vacated the premises and failed to pay rent within 
fifteen days and thus, as a matter of law, abandoned 
the premises. The factual findings show that Aris 
did not directly notify Defendants of any possible 
absence and did not pay the January rent. However, 
the findings also show that the doctors were still 
performing surgeries on the premises using Aris's 
equipment, and that Aris and the doctors were in 
negotiations for the sale of the business. Therefore, 
there is "reasonable evidence other than the 
presence of [Aris's] personal property" that Aris 
was still using the premises, and thus, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that there 
was no statutory presumption of abandonment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3). 
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[8] [9] [10] **20 Similarly, there was no 
abandonment under the common-law definition. "A 
lease may be abandoned when a tenant 'voluntarily 
relinquishes or vacates the leased premises with the 
intention to terminate contractual rights to ... 
possession and control of the premises. The 
requisite intent can be shown by words or conduct.' 
" State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (alteration in original) (quoting 49 
Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 250 (1995)). 
Whether an abandonment or surrender occurred, 
"was for the trial court to determine from the 
conduct and expressions of the parties with respect 
thereto." Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 
1330 (Utah 1977). 
**21 Defendants assert that Aris abandoned the 
lease by vacating the premises and turning over 
possession to the doctors. Whether Aris abandoned 
the premises depends on whether Aris intended to " 
'terminate contractual rights to ... possession and 
control of the premises,' " which is a question of 
fact. Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 970 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and 
Tenant § 250 (1995)); see also Pennington v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) 
("We emphasize that intent is a question of fact."). 
The district court's holding that Aris did not intend 
to abandon the premises prior to January 22, 2002, 
is not clearly erroneous. Aris did not turn over 
contractual rights to possession to the doctors, but 
merely allowed the doctors to continue to use Aris's 
equipment while negotiations took place. See, e.g., 
Ontel Corp. v. Helasol Realty Corp., 130 A.D.2d 
639, 515 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1987) (holding that the 
tenant did not abandon the lease where it "was 
merely readying the premises in preparation for the 
occupancy by the proposed assignee"). Where Aris 
did not intend to abandon the premises prior to 
January 22, 2002, the district court properly held 
there was no abandonment. See Hawkins, 967 P.2d 
at 970. 
II. Forcible Detainer and Wrongful Eviction 
[11] **22 "Both [the forcible entry and detainer] 
statutes and the tort action derived from them 
require that unless a tenant plainly abandons the 
premises, a landlord must resort to judicial process 
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if he wishes to be rid of a tenant in peaceable 
possession " Pentecost v Harward, 699 P 2d 696, 
699- 700 (Utah 1985) "One who resorts to 
self-help is liable to the evicted tenant " Id 
[12] **23 Defendants argue that even if the court 
finds there was no abandonment, the forcible 
detainer statute still does not apply The statute 
provides 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
either (1) by force, or by menaces and threats of 
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the 
possession of any real property, whether the same 
was acquired peaceably or otherwise, or, (2) in 
the nighttime, or during the absence of the 
occupants of any real property, unlawfully enters 
thereon, and after demand made for the surrender 
thereof, refuses for the period of three days to 
surrender the same to such former occupant The 
occupant of real property within the meaning of 
this subdivision is one who within five days 
precedmg such unlawful entry was m the 
peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands 
Utah Code Ann § 78-36-2 (2002) The district 
court held that Defendants unlawfully *30 held the 
premises by force creating a forcible detainer under 
part (1) of the statute The factual findings reflect 
the following Defendants refused to allow Ans to 
remove its equipment from the premises, despite 
several requests from Ans representatives, 
Defendants directed Ans's representative, Ennght, 
to leave the premises or they would contact the 
police, Defendants changed the locks on two 
occasions without notifying Ans or providing it a 
key, Defendants provided Ans supervised access to 
the premises, requiring Ans to gain permission to 
enter, on several occasions Defendants 
intentionally deprived Ans from entry onto the 
premises, and, "Ans did not have free and 
unfettered access to the premises nor could it 
remove its personal property" Based on these 
findings of fact, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion m holding that Defendants used "force" 
and "unlawfully [held] and [kept] possession of 
[the] real property" Id § 78- 36-2(1) 
**24 Defendants, although conceding the findings 
© 2005 Thomson/West No ( 
of fact, offer several arguments in their brief as to 
why the forcible detainer statute does not apply 
First, they argue that their actions against Ans did 
not constitute force and, therefore, they are not 
liable under Utah Code section 78-36- 2(1) The 
district court's findings that Defendants used "force, 
or menaces and threats of violence," are 
supported by the evidence Id Defendants changed 
the locks and on one occasion threatened to call the 
police if an Ans representative did not leave the 
premises However, even if Defendants' actions did 
not constitute force, they would still be liable for 
forcible detamer under part (2) of Utah Code 
section 78-36-2, where "during the absence of the 
occupants" Defendants unlawfully entered the 
premises and refused to sunender the premises to 
Ans Id § 78-36-2(2) 
**25 Second, Defendants assert that they legally 
could not render possession to Ans because the 
doctors possessed the premises, and Ans did not 
have the nght to take possession by self-help This 
argument is not sound Ans did not abandon the 
premises, and therefore, Ans still had rights to 
possession Though Ans and the doctors discussed 
the option of the doctors assummg the lease, the 
negotiations were unsuccessful, and the doctors did 
not have any rights to the premises supenor to those 
of Ans 
**26 Third, Defendants claim that, pursuant to 
paragraph 20 1 of the lease, they were entitled to 
enter the premises and dispose of the equipment if 
Ans abandoned the premises However, because 
there was no abandonment, this clause m the lease 
does not apply 
[13][14] **27 Fourth, Defendants assert that the 
forcible detainer statute does not apply because Axis 
did not seek restitution of the premises Defendants 
argue that the statute limits relief to those seeking 
restitution [FN1] Although "[e]very person" who 
commits the acts specified m the statute "is guilty of 
forcible detainer," id § 78-36-2, Defendants cite 
Utah Code section 78-36-10(1), which provides that 
"[a] judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises " 
Utah Code Ann § 78-36-10(1) (2002) However, 
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that same section also provides a plaintiff with the 
nght to be awarded damages incurred as the result 
of the forcible detainer See Utah Code Ann § 
78-36-10(2) A tenant is therefore entitled to 
restitution and an award of damages upon showing 
the landlord's liability See id A tenant is not 
required to seek restitution of the premises-but may 
pursue such relief See Fowler v Setter, 838 P 2d 
675, 679 (Utah Ct App 1992) (holding that 
"pursuant to section 78-36-10(3), the trial court was 
required to treble the jury's damages award" where 
the court found forcible entry, even though the 
plaintiffs did not seek restitution), Pentecost v 
Harward, 699 P 2d 696, 699 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that if the facts were viewed in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff they would support an 
action against the defendants for forcible entry 
under the statute and *31 the tort action derived 
from such statute, where the party was seeking 
damages), Peterson v Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 400 
P2d 507, 508 (1965) (affirming an award of 
damages under the forcible entry and detainer 
statute, without any mention of the party seeking 
restitution) The district court therefore properly 
interpreted the forcible detainer statute by 
awarding treble damages to Aris, even though it 
did not seek restitution [FN2] 
FN1 Defendants rely upon Freeway Park 
Building, Inc v Western States Wholesale 
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P 2d 778 
(1969) In Freeway Park, unlike in the 
present case, the parties did not brmg an 
action for forcible detamer Therefore, the 
court's dicta as to when the forcible 
detamer statute applies does not govern 
this case 
FN2 Defendants also assert that the 
forcible detainer statute does not apply 
because Defendants had a lessor's hen on 
the equipment pursuant to Utah Code 
section 38-3-1 See Utah Code Ann § 
38-3-1 (2001) Defendants did not raise 
this argument below, and therefore, cannot 
address it on appeal See Carrier v Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98,11 43, 104 P 3d 
1208 
© 2005 Thomson/West No C 
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[15] **28 Additionally, Defendants separately 
assert that the district court erred in ruling that they 
were liable for wrongful eviction As stated above, 
Aris did not abandon the premises, and therefore, it 
was m legal possession Defendants wrongfully 
evicted Aris by not permitting Aris complete access 
to the premises on January 22, 2002 See Freeway 
Park Bldg, Inc v Western States Wholesale Supply, 
22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P 2d 778, 781 (1969) (stating 
that a landlord cannot take the law into his own 
hands and evict a defaulting tenant) 
III Conversion 
[16] **29 Defendants assert that the district court 
erred in ruling that they converted Aris's equipment 
because Aris had abandoned the premises and 
turned over possession to the doctors As explained 
above, Aris did not abandon the premises, and 
therefore, Defendants' argument fails Defendants 
also claim that Aris waived its claim of conversion 
by leaving the equipment on the premises and 
working with Defendants to find a new tenant The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated "that there is only 
one legal standard required to establish waiver 
under Utah law A waiver is the mtentional 
relinquishment of a known right To constitute a 
waiver, there must be an existing nght, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it" Soter's v Deseret Fed 
Sav & Loan, 857 P 2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) 
(citation and quotations omitted) A waiver "must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied" Id at 940 (quotations and citation 
omitted) 
**30 The district court specifically held that Axis 
did not waive its conversion claim Aris agreed to 
postpone the hearing on its writ of replevm while 
the parties tried to find a new tenant for the 
premises There was not a settlement between the 
parties, only an agreement to postpone litigation to 
see if a settlement could be reached There was no 
expressed or implied distinctive waiver, therefore, 
the district court's holdmg was not clearly 
erroneous See id, see also Pennington v Allstate 
Ins Co 973 P 2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (statmg 
that the determination of intent is a question of fact, 
and thus, will only be reversed if the district court's 
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finding is clearly erroneous). 
IV. Damages 
[17][18][19][20][21] **31 "One who resorts to 
self-help is liable to the evicted tenant for all 
damages proximately caused by the eviction ...." 
Pentecost, 699 P.2d at 700. Utah Code section 
78-36-10 states that M[t]he jury or the [district] court 
... shall also assess the damages resulting to the 
plaintiff" Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Defendants 
assert that the district court erred in its assessment 
of damages. The district court's assessment of 
damages is not clearly erroneous, and therefore, we 
do not upset its determination. [FN3] See In re 
Estate of Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 
1996). The amount of damages totaled 
$187,687.63, [FN4] and under the forcible *32 
detainer statute, the judgment shall be "for three 
times the amount of damages assessed." [FN5] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3). We therefore 
affirm the award of $563,062.90. 
FN3. Defendants argue that the district 
court erred by awarding lost opportunity 
damages. Though the district court 
considered evidence on the issue, it did not 
in fact award such damages. 
FN4. The dissent opposes the award of 
$118,000 in depreciation, stating that 
"depreciation is not a measure of 
recoverable damages at all." "Whether the 
district court applied the correct rule for 
measuring damages is a question of law 
that we review for correctness." Mahana 
v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59,K 
25, 96 P.3d 893 (Utah 2004). "Generally, 
the measure of damages in a conversion 
action is the value of the converted 
property at the time of conversion, plus 
interest." Id. at ^ 26. "To the extent 
possible, the fundamental purpose of 
compensatory damages is to place the 
plaintiff in the same position he would 
have occupied had the tort not been 
committed." Id. In this case, the district 
court awarded the value of the property at 
the time of conversion less the end value of 
the property. Where Wasatch eventually 
returned the property to Aris, the district 
court, in awarding depreciation or 
diminishment in value, placed Aris "in the 
same position [it] would have occupied 
had the tort not been committed." Id. 
FN5. The dissent asserts that damages for 
conversion of personal property as a result 
of a forcible detainer should not be trebled 
as required by the forcible detainer statute. 
Utah Code section 78-36-10 requires that 
damages "resulting to the plaintiff from ... 
forcible or unlawful detainer" be trebled. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-36-10 (2002). As the 
dissent quotes, "the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover such damages as are the natural 
and proximate consequence of the 
unlawful detainer." Forrester v. Cook, 11 
Utah 137, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930). The 
dissent contends, citing Forrester, that 
"general damages for forcible detainer is 
the reasonable rental value of the premises 
for the time during which they were 
unlawfully detained." However, the 
Forrester court merely held that the "rental 
value during the unlawful withholding of 
possession is the minimum of damages" 
and "damages may not be restricted to the 
rental value and may include more." 
Forrester, 292 P. at 214. 
CONCLUSION 
**32 Aris did not abandon the premises where it 
did not intend to vacate prior to January 22, 2002. 
Given that there was no abandonment, Defendants 
are liable for forcible detainer, wrongful eviction, 
and conversion where they took and kept possession 
of the premises by self-help. Further, Aris did not 
waive a conversion claim by agreeing to postpone 
the hearing on its writ of replevin and assist 
Defendants in locating a new tenant. Finally, the 
district court properly assessed the amount of 
damages. 
**33 Accordingly, we affirm. 
**341 CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
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ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
**35 I am baffled by the trial court's award of 
damages and by the majority's affirmance of the 
entire award. I have no problem with the award of 
some $16,000 to compensate the tenant for personal 
property that came up missing while the landlord 
was wrongfully in possession of the premises. 
Likewise, I have no qualms about an award of 
$53,000 to compensate the tenant for damage to its 
lasers while in the landlord's "care." I fail to see, 
however, how damages for conversion and damages 
for trespass to chattels can be trebled pursuant to a 
statute that permits the extraordinary remedy of 
tripling the amount of actual damages for the 
forcible detainer of a real estate leasehold. 
**36 The severe remedy of treble damages is 
available because of the special status of real estate, 
and it is a remedy that is pretty well limited to real 
property contexts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-2 
(2002) (providing for trebling of damages for waste 
of real estate); id. § 78-38-3 (providing for trebling 
of damages to owner of land whose trees are cut 
down without authorization); id. § 
78-36-10(2)(a)-(d), (3) (providing for trebling of 
damages for forcible entry, forcible or unlawful 
detainer, and waste, but not for unpaid rent). It 
subverts the purpose of that long-standing policy 
favoring real estate to treble all damages in an 
action between a tenant and landlord just because 
forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of 
that litigation. See Forrester v. Cook, 11 Utah 137, 
292 P. 206, 214 (1930) ( "The provision for 
damages in three times the amount of [actual] 
damages is highly penal and therefore subject to 
strict construction. While the statute provides for 
recovery of rents, damages, and waste, it is damages 
only that are to be trebled.... The plaintiff is entitled 
to recover such damages as are the natural and 
proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer."), 
overruled in part on other grounds by P.K Inv. v. 
Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018,1020-21 (Utah 1991). 
**37 The measure of general damages for forcible 
detainer is the reasonable rental value of the 
premises for the time during which they were 
unlawfully detained. See id. at 211, 214. Accord 
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Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-26 
(Utah Ct.App.1989) (relying on Forrester, appellate 
court affirmed *33 unlawful detainer damages of 
$300, representing the "reasonable rental value" of 
the premises for the period they were unlawfully 
detained, but directed trebling in accordance with 
statute because such "rental value" is damages for 
unlawful detainer rather than rent, as trial court 
assumed). Such general damages appear not to 
have been awarded in this case. Insofar as the 
damages that were awarded might be viewed as 
consequential damages resulting from forcible 
detainer, it is settled law that consequential or 
"special" damages are available, if at all, only if 
general damages are awarded. [FN1] See 22 
Am.Jur.2d Damages § 43 (2d ed. 2003) ("As a 
general rule, a verdict for special damages without 
an allowance for general damages is improper."). 
Cf. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039, 
1041-43 (Utah 1981) (noting that jury assessment 
of special damages without general damages is 
irregularity on face of verdict); Cohn v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975) (stating 
that if judge had believed jury's verdict only 
assessed special damages and not general damages, 
judge would not have accepted verdict) (Utah 
1975); Baden v. Sunset Fuel Co., 225 Or. 116, 357 
P.2d 410, 411 (1960) (citing "the well-established 
rule" that, in order for there to be an award of 
special damages, there must also be an award of 
more than nominal damages). 
FN1. Which is not to say that I necessarily 
agree that all consequential damages 
stemming from forcible detainer must be 
trebled along with general damages. 
**38 More bizarre is the award of over $118,000 
in depreciation. So far as I am aware, depreciation 
is not a measure of recoverable damages at all; 
rather, it is an offset against what would otherwise 
be the amount of damages. See generally Dan B. 
Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.12 at 392 (1973) ( 
"Cost of replacement or repair, with suitable 
adjustment for the fact that the damaged or 
destroyed property was old and had depreciated in 
value, is perhaps the factor most commonly 
considered in fixing value of property without 
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market"), id § 5 12 at 394 ("A number of 
courts have allow[ed] replacement cost less 
accrued depreciation[ ]") To award a plaintiff 
depreciation as damages is bad enough, but to treble 
that amount on a theory that depreciation was 
occasioned by the forcible detainer of a real estate 
leasehold is untenable given the very nature of 
depreciation See Black's Law Dictionary 441 (6th 
ed 1991) (defining depreciation as the "decline in 
value of property caused by wear or obsolescence") 
**39 I would remand this matter with instructions 
to comprehensively reassess—and substantially 
reduce—the amount of damages awarded to the 
tenant 
121 P3d 24, 530 Utah Adv Rep 11, 2005 UT 
App 326 
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APPENDIX B 
ORDER GRANTING CERTIORARI 
FILED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ITOflAPPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 03 2005 
ooOoo 
Wasatch Property Management, Inc. ^ 7 POP** 
and JDJ Properties, Inc., Uj 
Petitioners, 
v. Case No. 20050693-SC 
Aris Vision Institute, Inc., 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on August 17, 2005. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issue: , 
Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation 
to personal property may be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-36-10(3). 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant 
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that 
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to 
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be 
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by 
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon 
its issuance. 
FOR THE COURT: 
D a t e 7 Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
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